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 Abstract 
Our paper deals with the research question whether the association between 
management accounting system (MAS) design and controllership output quality is made 
by controllers, i.e., preparers of management accounting information, and managers, 
i.e., users of management accounting information, in a similar fashion. Based on data 
surveyed in 2007 with controllers and managers of German Top-1,500 firms we find 
empirical evidence for a preparer-user perception gap. For example, controllers 
associate the consistency of the financial language provided by the MAS in a 
significantly weaker fashion with controllership output quality than the managers. 
Underlying reasons for this perception gap might be found in the way management 
accounting information is used and hence demanded within the organization. 
Our paper contributes to the literature on MAS design in three respects. First, the 
evidence provided in our paper supports the notion that MAS design cannot be 
evaluated independently from an institutional reference point. Second, the identified 
preparer-user perception gap sheds light on observed frictions between controllers and 
managers. Third, we give an example on how a key-informant bias can be used as a 
source of research information. 
 - 1 - 
Management accounting system design and 
controllership output quality: evidence of a preparer   
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  	 

      information and make 
decisions is scarce. There are remarkably few analyses of what managers 
actually do with their time, or what information they use or might use. 
(James G. March, 1987, p. 162) 
 
1 Introduction 
In many cases, managerial decision-making is based on accounting information, 
especially with higher hierarchy levels and/or longer time horizons (Bruns/McKinnon, 
1993). In most modern firms, accounting information used for management purposes is 
provided by specialized agents, i.e., management accountants or 

 as in German-
speaking firms typically denoted 

 controllers (Weber/Schäffer, 2008). 
During the last two decades, a broad body of literature has discussed the role transition 
of controllers from a more traditional understanding as book-keepers, cost-recorders, 
watchdogs or scorekeepers to business advisors or change agents (Granlund/Lukka , 
1998; Burns/Ezzamel/Scapens, 1999; for an overview see Sorensen, 2009). 
Nevertheless, an increased sh
 ﬀﬁ ﬂﬀﬃ ﬂﬀ !" #ﬂ$ﬃ ﬀ %
help[ing]  the 
management team in the business decision-making process& (Sathe, 1982, p. 31) raises 
the question not only how accounting information is actually used by managers, as had 
been pointed out by James G. March in his address given in 1986 at the annual 
conference of the American Accounting Association, but also whether there might be 
divergent perceptions between controllers and managers on impact factors that 
ﬂﬀ!ﬃ' ("ﬀﬀ ) #ﬂﬂﬀ'!!" !ﬀﬁ#ﬀ! #! *'ﬃ  $ ﬂﬀ!ﬀ++ﬃ*, output quality. 
Therefore, our paper deals with the following research question: 
Do controllers, i.e., preparers of management accounting information, and 
managers, i.e., users of management accounting information, have different 
perceptions on the association between management accounting system 
(MAS) design variables and controllership output quality? 
Evidence for such a preparer-user gap, which might cause detrimental effects in the 
aspired role of the controller as business partner, has already been discussed in literature 
(e.g., Bruns/McKinnon, 1993; -./01/2345/6, 2003). From a methodological point of 
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view, diverging judgements of controllers and managers are also denoted as key-
   	
    	 		     informants may disagree because 
they hold different organizational positions and thus different perspectives on the same 
organizational phenomena Kumar/Stern/Anderson, 1993, p. 1636). Whereas many 
empirical studies see a key-informant bias as possible source of noise and result 
distortion, research on preparer-user gaps explicitly considers key-informant bias as a 
source of research information. 
In our paper, we take up an idea originally presented by ﬀﬁ (2003) who 
compare perceptions of managers and management accountants (controllers in our 
terminology) on MAS information as well as on managementﬂ	    ﬃ	

However, we transfer this setting into a different institutional context, as our analysis is 
nested in the fundamental shift of German management accounting practice from a dual 
towards an integrated structure. This shift has been observed since the 1990s, starting 
with Hasso Zieglerﬂ	 
  !"
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-30 multinationals. However, until today 
how to judge this change in MAS design is is still a matter of considerable 
methodological debate in both literature and practice (Jones/Luther, 2005; 
Ewert/Wagenhofer, 2007).  
More specifically, our paper investigates the possibility of a preparer-user perception 
gap between controllers and managers in German Top-1,500 firms with respect to the 
association between two special features of MAS design, i.e.,  
+ the integration of financial and management accounting system and  
+ the resulting consistency of financial language, 
and controllership output quality which based on the theory of rational choice is 
assumed to have an impact on managerial decision-making.  
Our study is built upon a database gathered by Weißenberger/Angelkort (W/A, 2009) 
whose analysis gives evidence that %	ﬂ 				  controllership output 
quality as well as impact on managerial decision making does not directly depend on 
the level of accounting system integration, but rather on the perception of MAS 
information as being consistent with financial accounting information (consistent 
financial language). The W/A study is based on a dyadic research design: Questions on 
the technical features of accounting system design (level of integration as independent 
variable) were answered by controllers whereas all dependent variables (consistency of 
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financial language, controllership output quality, impact on managerial decision-
making) were surveyed with both controllers and managers.  
However, in their original model W/A solely relate    	
  the 
dependent variables to the level of accounting system integration. Thus, the W/A 
analysis gives no information on whether controllers would associate the level of 
accounting system integration with the consistency of financial language and 
controllership output quality in a similar fashion. To close this research gap, our paper 
extends the W/A analysis towards a multi-group analysis 		   
answers on the dependent variables and thus capturing similarities as well as differences 
in the perceptions of controllers and managers. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in a threefold way. First, the evidence provided in 
our paper supports the notion that accounting system design cannot be evaluated 
independently from an institutional reference point. Second, the identified preparer-user 
perception gap might be used as a starting point in explaining deficiencies in accounting 
information use by managers which have been observed e.g., by Brignall et al. (1999) 
and which cannot be explained to a sufficient degree by more traditional theories 
focusing on a purely instrumental link between system design and information use. 
Third, it shows that the key-informant bias might not only be seen as a drawback or 
limitation in empirical research, but also as a potentially rich source of research 
information. 
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we give an overview on the literature 
used to derive our assumptions and also briefly present the W/A benchmark model. In 
section 3, we develop our hypotheses. Section 4 gives an overview of the 
methodological approach. Section 5 provides the empirical analysis which is conducted 
using structural equation modeling (SEM). Finally, in section 6, we discuss the 
implications of our results. 
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2 Literature 
2.1 Preparer-user gap: discrepancies in the perception of 
accounting information use 
The concept of a preparer-user perception gap in management accounting is primarily 
related to the works of  	 (2003). Based on semi-structured interviews, they 
identify differences in perceptions of managers and controllers on the management 
accounting information supplied by the controllers. Apart from other results, they find 
that compared to the view of production/sales managers of the firm, controllers 
overstate the quality of information they provide concerning relevance, accuracy, 
timeliness and satisfaction. In our paper, we take up the basic framework presented by 
 	 (2003), but use it in a different institutional setting and relate our 
assumptions more closely to the diverging concepts of accounting information use.  
A basic textbook approach suggests that management accounting information is used as 
an information system for internal decision-making purposes (e.g., 
Weygandt/Kieso/Kimmel, 2005). However, as this approach does not capture the 
diversity of firm practice, a broad body of literature has evolved around the question 
how a given set of information is used exactly.  
Seminal work in this field has been provided by Simon et al. (1954). They analyze the 
organization of the controlling department and classify the observed forms of 
information use into three categories: (1) Information is used as a problem-solver when 
it refers to the possible outcome of a due decision. (2) Score-carding as the second 
category refers to the role of information in monitoring the success of the business as a 
whole or its subunits. (3) In the third category, information is used for attention-

   
  ﬀ ﬀﬁ  ﬁﬂ uation.  
A second categorization relates to the works of Pelz (1978) who investigates the use of 
socio-scientific studies by decision-makers in politics. He identifies three roles of 
information use. (1) Information can be used in organizations in an instrumental 
fashion, i.e., as an immediate basis for decision-making in a given situation at hand. 
This type of use is closely linked to the category of problem-solving defined by Simon 
et al. (2) Conceptual information use is not solely focused on a partial problem or 
decision, but refers to the general perception of an organization and its environment. 
The conceptual use of information is also relevant for problem-solving, because it 
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influences and forms the perception of the context into which a problem is placed. 
Therefore, conceptual use of information can be interpreted as using information to 
shape a common weltanschauung in an organization. With reference to Simon et al., 
conceptual information use rather captures the features of scorecarding and attention-
directing than problem-solving. (3) Finally, Pelz identifies symbolic use of information 
as a third category. This type of use occurs when information is consulted to legitimate 
a decision, which already has been made on a different basis of information. In that 
case, information has no influence on a decision, but only serves as an argumentative 
support for a decision already made. As symbolic use of information is typically 
disguised in an instrumental or conceptual fashion, our deliberations focus in the 
following in the first two categories established by Pelz, i.e., instrumental and 
conceptual use of MAS information. 
Basically, discrepancies between the prepares and users of MAS information regarding 
the predominant type of information use might lead to diverging judgements on what 
   	

MAS design. For example, preparers typically imply that an 
information system functions appropriately if the relevant technical specifications are 
met (technical validity). Users however relate the suitability of an information system 
rather to its organizational validity, i.e., its ability to enhance job performance 
(Schultz/Slevin, 1975). These deviations might have detrimental effects. For example, 
the literature on management information systems supports the notion that actual use of 
information is closely associated with perceived usefulness (Robey, 1979), and also give 
evidence on the impact of user involvement on system success (Tait/Vessey, 1988).  
Specifically with respect to accounting information, Bruns/McKinnon (1993) point out 
that managers are going to develop and use other sources of information,  
management accounting system can provide information in the metric and the timely 
   ﬀﬀﬁ (p. 106). Shields (1995) analyses the detrimental effects 
of a preparer-user gap regarding MAS information more closely. With respect to 
activity-based costing systems ﬂ one of the major MAS innovations in the 1990s Shields 
finds that not technical but rather behavioral and organizational variables enhance the 
suitability of MAS information. This entails that controllers are not able to provide an 
effective MAS design ﬃ  
  ! ﬃ "#$ if they do not understand or 
even misjudge the drivers of user satisfaction with MAS design.  
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This implication has also been one of the triggers of our research, as we observe a 
fundamental shift in German management accounting practice. Since the mid-1990s, 
German management accounting has moved from a dual towards an integrated 
structure. Instead of using non-GAAP-based accruals for operational performance 
measurement and internal business analysis, the recent management control techniques 
in Germany are based on financial accounting data. This has been a matter of 
considerable debate in German literature (e.g., Ziegler, 1994; Pfaff, 1995; for an 
overview see Ewert/Wagenhofer, 2007), which nevertheless is mainly focusing on the 
scope of integration, but neglecting the systems dimension (Bjornenak/Olsen, 1999), 
i.e., the links between the users of the management accounting system as well as the 
design of the management accounting system. 
2.2 Benchmark Model 
The empirical analysis in our paper is based on research provided by 
Weißenberger/Angelkort (2009) (W/A), who analyse the effect of an integrated 
accounting system design on controllership effectiveness (a summary construct 
capturing the causal relation between controllership output quality and impact on 
managerial decision-making) in German companies.  
The model by W/A comprises 
   	
 	  	    	
  consistency  		   	    	  
 	 	     		     incorporate the technical 
aspects of the accounting system as well as the user perspective into their study, W/A 
use a dyadic research design. This means that from each company which participated in 
the study a controller as well as a general manager were questioned. The dyadic 
approach       the  	 	      
as well as the user perspective on management accounting information. An overview on 
the variables analyzed by W/A is depicted in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Benchmark Model by Weißenberger/Angelkort (2009) 
The variable 
  	
	   
 is the exogenous element of the 
model. It represents the degree to which management accounting systems are 
technically integrated within the financial accounting systems. The variable is formed 
by employing an index averaging the scores of 17 indicators which refer to con
		
tasks with respect to providing MAS information (see appendix 1). The three 
 
	 	  
assessment. The variable 
 
consistency of 
	 	
 measures the extent to which the management perceives information 
which is provided by management accounting and financial accounting as coherent. In 
other words, the variable represents whether the management and financial accounting 
succeed in addressing similar business phenomena in a similar fashion. Three reflective 
indicators are used to form this variable (see appendix 2). The second endogenous 
variable  		  	    
	  
		      e.g., scope, timeliness or accuracy. This 
variable is based on six reflective survey items (see appendix 3).  Controllership impact 
   as the third endogenous variable reflects the extent to which 
the controllers influence the process of decision-making in management. This variable 
is derived from three reflective indicators (see appendix 4). 
The model tested by W/A assumes that   	
	    has an 
impact on  		  	 in two distinct ways:  
(1) The integration level is hypothesized to have a direct effect on the perceived 
controllership output quality. This rather technical viewpoint assumes that solely a 
Consistency
of financial
language
Controllership
output quality
Controllership
impacton 
management
decisions
Integration 
level of
accounting
systems
Variable measurement based upon answers of controllers
Variable measurement based upon answers ofmanagers
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more integrated accounting system design augments the output quality by 
providing accounting information faster and in a more aligned fashion. 
(2) Furthermore, the integration level possesses an impact on controllership output 
quality in an indirect way via the mediating effect of  consistency of financial 
. Integrated accounting systems are based on the data and thus on the 
conceptual framework of financial accounting. Therefore, integrated accounting 
systems provide MAS information which is coherent with financial accounting 
information. In other words, both financial and management accounting supply 
	 

 	     	 	  	 
  
facilitate the establishing of a consistent financial language for internal and 
external communication purposes.  
Furthermore, the W/A model assumes the variable  	







 
	    	   	




  

 
 
	






  	



 	 


 

	 
department should influence the degree to which the management uses MAS 
information as an underpinning for the decision-making process. 
Data for this study was obtained by means of a questionnaire-based survey in the period 
from September to November 2007. Starting point for this survey was a database 
including information about German Top-1,500 companies with regard to sales volume. 
Financial institutions were excluded due to their specific accounting requirements; other 
companies had to be excluded for other reasons, e.g., lack of controlling department. In 
the end W/A contacted 1,269 companies and acquired 149 dyadic sets of completed 
questionnaires, this equals a return rate of 11.7%. The research results of W/A based on 
this data are shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Results of the SEM by Weißenberger/Angelkort (2009) 
As can be seen in Figure 2, W/A find no evidence for a significant direct effect of the 
integration level of accounting systems on controllership output quality. However, the 
parameter estimates point towards an indirect positive effect between these two 
  	
 	
 of financial language

 acting as a fully mediating variable: 
The 
  
integration level of accounting syste
 
  	 
 < .001) and 
also relevant (.43) positive association with 
	 
 financial language

 
explaining 18% of the variance of the latter variable. The 
  
controllership output 
quality

 is also positively 
	 	
 	
of financial language
 ﬀ
p < .001), with 45% of the variance of the former variable explained. 
The results of W/A relate to ﬁﬂﬃ !"ﬂ#$ﬃ %&'()* theory of cognitive dissonance. 
According to Festinger  human-beings have a tendency to neglect inconsistent 
information in their decision-making process. So-called cognitive dissonances are 
experienced when pieces of information + be it for inconsistency or contradiction + do 
not fit together. These cognitive dissonances create psychological uncomfortability and 
decision makers are inclined to diminish them by blinding out inconsistent information. 
, 	 -	 practice in the eyes of the management therefore 
provides information consistent to financial accounting information. Incoherent 
management accounting information might simply be ignored by the management 
during a decision making process.  
These results support the following (still tentative) theory. First, managers information 
demand is not met by the controllers if a purely instrumental approach is taken: a 
technically sophisticated and integrated accounting information system itself is not to be 
Consistency
of financial
language
Controllership
outputquality
Controllership
impact on 
management
decisions
Integration 
level of
accounting
systems
R2=.18
R2=.45 R2=.30
.43*** .67***
.55***.00
*** p<.001 Variable measurementbased upon answers of controllers
Variable measurementbased upon answers ofmanagers
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considered a direct driver for the perceived controllership output quality. Second, the 
specifications of MAS design   		
 	    
output quality only by influencing the consistency of financial language at least to a 
certain degree. In other words, managers demand information in a conceptual form to 
create a context for decision-making. This notion is also supported by 
Angelkort/Sandt/Weißenberger (2009) in a study conducted with Austrian IFRS-users. 
Allowing for the communication aspect of the MAS information is therefore of utter 
importance for the 		      management. It is essential for 
controllers to support managerial decision-making          
meet managem 	   information. 
3 Hypothesis development 
Our research objective is to explore whether a preparer-user perception gap divides 
controllers and managers in their function as preparers and users of management 
accounting information. As described above, W/A find evidence that managers use and 
therefore require MAS information in a conceptual fashion, i.e., information 
	  
 	      	 	st, current or future state. 

  		
 	  	   	 	    	 
be aware of the importance of this conceptual information use. However, it is doubtable 
whether controllers are conscious of this part of their task. In the literature on 
management information systems, several studies show that preparers as well as users 
of information have fundamentally different perspectives (for an overview, see 
ﬀﬁﬂﬃﬂ !"#ﬂ$, 2003). Transferring these notions to the work of controllers who are 
responsible for the MAS design, they also might neglect the magnitude of conceptual 
information use and largely consider information only in its instrumental function. Our 
	  	  behavior are in line with the functional fixation 
hypothesis established in early behavioral accounting literature (Ijiri/Jaedicke/Knight, 
1966), as MAS textbooks typically convey an instrumental perspective on accounting, 
but neglect the link between MAS design and MAS use (Bjorenak/Olsen, 1999).  
The resulting preparer-user perception gap would become visible in the model by W/A if 
 	
             	 	  
	   
	 
  	   
%
	  were dissimilar between the 
group of the managers and the group of the controllers. While the study by W/A already 
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shows that for the group of the managers the effect between the two variables mainly 
exists in an indirect conceptual way, we assume that this is different for the group of the 
controllers. 
First, we hypothesize     	 
       
   

    		 	       	   
     	  
H1:  For the group of the controllers the extent of the direct effect of the integration 
level of accounting systems on controllership output quality is higher than for the 
group of the managers. 
In reverse, this would lead to the assumption that controllers fail to notice the important 
conceptual indirect effect between the variables. Therefore our second hypothesis is as 
follows: 
H2:  For the group of the controllers the extent of the indirect effect of the integration 
level of accounting systems on controllership output quality, with consistency of 
financial language acting as a mediating variable, is lower than for the group of 
the managers. 
4 Research method 
We use the research model by W/A as the basis for our multi-group analysis and 
consistently employ a SEM analysis on Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation. 
A multi-group analysis is an instrument to test two or more groups for equality of 
estimated parameters (Steenkamp/Baumgartner, 1998). This is done by testing a 
consecution of nested models (Bagozzi/Yi, 1988; Steinmetz et al., 2009): (1) In a first 
step a baseline model is calculated. In this model the parameters for all groups included 
are calculated freely and simultaneously. (2) In a second step a set of parameters 
between the groups is constrained to be estimated as equal and the model is 
recalculated. Such a constraint normally leads to deterioration in the model fit. (3) To 
test for differences in the model parameters the measures of fit between the baseline 
model and the constrained model have to be compared. This is usually performed using 
a 2-difference test. If the degradation of model fit between the baseline model and 
constrained model is found to be significant, the null hypothesis of equal parameters 
across the groups has to be rejected. 
The group classification of a multi-group analysis should be conducted in accordance to 
the variable which is presumed to have a moderating influence on the model parameters. 
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Since group membership is a discrete variable our procedure is fairly plain. In our case 
we divide the respondents into two groups according to their function in their respective 
company. One group is comprised only of managers while the other group contains 
controllers. 
5 Results 
We test the discussed hypothesis by conducting a multi-group analysis using the 
original data collected by W/A.  
Our aim is to find out whether for the respondents being either part of the controllers or 
managers as organizational groups the group membership has a moderating effect upon 
the parameters of the benchmark model. In other words, we intend to detect whether the 
group of controllers and the group of managers make different associations with the 
variables surveyed. Our main focus is the issue of different perceptions on how the 
integration level of accounting systems influences the controllership output quality. 
Perceived differences among the two groups concerning the direct or the indirect link 
between the two variables would point towards the existence of a preparer-user 
perception gap. 
To reflect the perspective of the managers as the first group all endogenous variables are 
surveyed with the managers while only the ex
   	
 		    
 	  	 
        This is the same procedure as 
presented in the model by W/A. To catch the perception of the controllers as the second 
group we use the same model structure, but this time all variables, the exogenous as 
well as all the endogenous, are based upon the answers of the controllers. To minimize 
measurement distortions, we measure all latent variables for both groups with the same 
set of underlying reflective indicators, which leads to a single difference compared to 
the model originally published by W/A 	      	  t quality, 
 	      	
    	 	 ﬀ  	
item from the controllers 	      ouput quality but rather input 
quality. Our methodological considerations are supported by the empirical evidence as 
including this indicator leads to an inferior model fit for the group of controllers. 
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A schema of our approach is depicted in Figure 3 below: 
 
Figure 3: Model design for multi-group analysis 
Before testing for group differences concerning the effects between the variables, we 
assess the reliability and validity of the endogenous latent variables for each of the two 
  	
   	  	 	   

		    	
index averaging the scores of underlying items, which are measured with the 
controllers, the variable has not to be assessed. 
 
Table 1: Reliability and validity of the endogenous variables 
As presented in Table 1 the endogenous variables fulfil the common criteria for 
 	     	
 alpha exceed the critical value of .70 
(Nunally, 1994). Furthermore all values for the factor reliability are above the critical 
Group 1
Group 2
Variable measurementbased upon answers of controllers
Variable measurementbased upon answers ofmanagers
Integration level of
accounting systems
Consistency of
financial language
Controllership
output quality
Controllership
impacton 
management
decisions
Variable Group Cronbach's 
alpha
Factor 
reliability
Average variance 
explained
1 .82 .83 .62
2 .79 .81 .59
1 .90 .88 .60
2 .82 .83 .50
1 .89 .89 .73
2 .87 .87 .69
Consistency of 
financial language
Controllership output 
quality
Controllership input 
on management 
decisisons
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value of .60 and all values for the average variance explained exceed the threshold of 
.50 (Bagozzi/Yi, 1988). 
As mentioned above, we test for significant differences concerning the effects between 
the variables across the two groups in three steps (Bagozzi/Yi, 1988): In a first step, we 
form a baseline model, in which all parameters of the first and second group are 
estimated freely and simultaneously. Due to the fact that all parameters are formed in 
only one run, we receive only   2-statistic representing the fit of the model. The 
empirical results of this unconstrained baseline model can be seen in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4: Empirical results of the unconstrained baseline model 
Indicators of the model fit are displayed in Table 2 (model A). In a second step, we 
conduct a series of calculations, in which we constrain pairs of effects across the two 
groups. For each of the four effect types we conduct a calculation, in which the specific 
set of effects is constrained to be estimated as equal across the group of the managers 
and the controllers. For each one of the constrained models we obtain a 2-statistic. The 
results of these tests for invariance can be seen in Table 2 (models B-D). In order to 
evaluate whether the group membership operates as a moderating effect we finally 
*** p < .001; ** p< .01
Consistency
of financial
language
Controllership
output quality
Controllership 
impact on 
management 
decisions
Integration 
level of
accounting
systems
R2=.18
R2=.44 R2=.30
b2_1= .42*** b3_1= .66***
b4_1= .55***b1_1= .01
Group 1
Consistency
of financial
language
Controllership
output quality
Controllership
impacton 
management
decisions
Integration 
level of
accounting
systems
R2=.22
R2=.19 R2=.30
b2_2= .47*** b3_2= .37**
b4_2= .59***b1_2= .11
Group 2
Variable measurementbased upon answers of controllers
Variable measurementbased upon answers ofmanagers
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   	

2
- statistic of the unconstrained baseline model with each of the 
corresponding values of the four constrained models. 
 
Table 2: Tests for invariance of effects 
H1 stated that the direct effect between 

integration level of accounting systems

 and 

controllership output quality

 is higher among the group of the controllers than among 
the group of the managers. This hypothesis is analysed in model B in which we 
constrain this direct effect to be estimated as equal among the two groups. As can be 


  







  


 	

2
-statistic of .51 which is below the critical 
threshold of 3.84 (significant at 5%-level).1 This 

 even modest 

 deterioration in the 
model fit cannot be seen as evidence supporting H1. In other words, the assumption that 
the direct link between integration level of financial language and controllership 
output quality is higher for the group of the controllers than for the group of the 
managers cannot be confirmed. 
In order to analyse H2, which claims that the extent of the indirect link between 
integration level of accounting systems and controllership output quality is lower 
with the group of the controllers than with the group of the managers, we rely on the 
models C and D. What demands attention is the value for the 	
2-statistic in model D. 
This constrained model shows a highly significant deterioration of model fit, with a 
value for 	
2 above the critical threshold of 6.63 (significant at 1%-level).  
                                                     
 
 
1
  Critical values for 2 (gaining 1 df) are as follows: 2
 
ﬀ ﬁﬂﬃ  !" ﬂ#$%& 
2
 
ﬀ 'ﬂ'ﬁ  !" ﬂ#(%&  

2
 
ﬀ (#ﬂﬃﬁ  !" ﬂ##(%ﬂ 
Model Constraints )
2
(df)
*)
2
+
*
,-.
RMSEA CFI
A Unconstrained 117.33(102) / .02 .99
B b1_1=b1_2 117.84(103)
.51
(1) .02 .99
C b2_1=b2_2 117.90(103)
.57
(1) .02 .99
D b3_1=b3_2 124.91(103)
7.58**
(1) .03 .99
E b4_1=b4_2 117.67(103)
.34
(1) .02 .99
**p < .01
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The null hypothesis of equal effects among the two groups has therefore to be rejected 
and it can be assumed that group membership has a moderating effect on the link 
between   of financial language	 and  controllership output quality	. This 
indicates that the association between   
 language	 and  controllership 
output quality	 differs significantly between the group of the managers and the group of 
the controllers. As can be seen in Figure 4, the effect between the two variables varies 
substantially across the two groups in regard to the magnitude of the effect. Managers 
judge the effect (.66) between the two variables considerably stronger than controllers 
(.37). So, in the eyes of the controllers, a unified financial language does not seem to be 
as important for the output quality as in the eyes of the mangers. This finding 
corroborates H2, because controllers judge the extent of an important part of the indirect 
link between the integration of accounting systems and the controllership output quality 
lower than the managers.  
But as can be seen in model C, H2 is only partly confirmed. The value for the 

2
-
statistic of this constrained model shows that there is no relevant proof for the existence 
of a moderating group effect upon the link between  integration level of accounting 
systems	 and   of financial language	. As can be seen in Figure 4, the link 
between the two variables is positive for both groups and does not differ distinctly. 
Generally can be stated that although only one path of the indirect effect between the 





  

 

 
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significantly different among the two groups, this discrepancy influences the whole 
indirect effect. The overall magnitude of the indirect effect is .28 for the group of the 
managers while the magnitude of the indirect effect is .17 for the group of the 
controllers. 
It is remarkable that although both groups realize that an integration of accounting 
systems helps establishing a unified financial language in the company, the controllers 
estimate the impact of this common language on the perceived controllership output 
quality fairly low in comparison to the managers. In our view this is exactly where a 
preparer-user perception gap becomes visible. For managers the existence of a unified 
financial language is highly important since it influences their perception of the 

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management information when it is in line with the common financial perspective on 
the organization. In other words, they use information in a conceptual form and 
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therefore require management information according to this demand. Controllers 
however are not aware of the extent of this information demand. They recognise the link 
between a common financial language and the controllership output quality but 
obviously underestimate it. 
6 Conclusion 
We show evidence for the existence of a preparer-user perception gap between 
controllers and managers regarding the use of accounting information. Controllers do 
not seem to realize to what extent the perceived quality of their work depends on how 
they succeed in providing the management with conceptual and congruent information.  
Diminishing this existing perception gap would be a benefit for both groups. Managers 
would profit, since the quality of management accounting information they perceive as 
necessary for the process of decision-making would be augmented. The controllers 
would profit, since the perception gap dilutes their influence on managerial decision-
making. Therefore the reduction of the perception gap would have motivational benefits 
for the controllers. By supplying information that is in line with the demand of 
management they can strengthen their role as business advisors and gain a more 
influential position inside the organization. 
This discrepancy between managers and controllers can only be reduced by enhancing 
communication between the two groups. Managers on the one hand have to make 
transparent what type of information they use and need. Controllers on the other hand 
have to dissociate themselves from being pure specialists and have to embrace a broader 
and hence a more conceptual view on the organization. 
Our findings implicate the importance of the systems perspective for future research. 
The quality and the mechanisms of a system like the accounting system are not to be 
seen as interdependent from the functional and hierarchical perspective of the evaluator. 
To catch the full organizational perspective on an existing system one has to analyze the 
distinct perspectives of the groups involved with the system. Although this is a rather 
complex and laborious research procedure it offers the chance to construct a holistic 
image of perceived realities. 
Consequently the often criticised key-informant bias has to be seen in a different light. 
Since there is no unbiased and objective reality the notion that it could be distorted by 
focussing on a distinct informant has to be reviewed. By accepting and analyzing 
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subjectivity we can learn more about social reality which consists of the multiplicity of 
different perspectives. 
Appendix 
Appendix 1:  Summary statistics on the 17 indicators underlying the variable 
  	
	    
  
 -indices 
referring to the main tasks constituting controllership 
Indicator Mean Std. Dev. 
Sub-index: Planning and budgeting 
To which extent is short-term planning and budgeting based on valuation 
methods in accordance with financial GAAP on top management level? 
 
   ﬀﬁﬂﬃ ﬃ    !"#! $ %&'()
 
4.08 1.21 
To which extent is valuation within medium-term planning and budgeting 
based on valuation methods in accordance with financial GAAP on top 
management level? 
 
   ﬀﬁﬂﬃ ﬃ    !"#! $ %&'*)
 
4.05 1.22 
What is the level of congruence between management control structure and 
legal structure for planning and budgeting purposes? 
 
   ﬀﬁﬂﬃ ﬃ    !"#! $ %&'()
 
3.34 1.44 
Sub-index: Reporting 
To which extent are deadlines for management reporting and financial 
reporting harmonized? 
 
   ﬀﬁﬂﬃ ﬃ    !"#! $ %&'()
 
4.28 1.03 
How many workdays are required to report monthly financial key performance 
indicators (KPI) to top management in accordance to financial GAAP? 
 ( 0 = KPIs are not calculated in accordance with financial GAAP 
  1 = >20 workdays 
  2 = 13-20 workdays 
  3 = 7-12 workdays 
   4 = 4-6 workdays 
  5 = 1-3 workdays / N=149) 
2.91 1.33 
To which extent are imputed or opportunity cost and revenue types used for 
management control purposes? (reverse coded item) 
    !"#!ﬃ ﬃ    ﬀﬁﬂ $ %&'() 
3.62 1.51 
To which extent can single line items/sums in the internal management reports 
be reconciled with corresponding items in the income statement? 
    !"#!ﬃ ﬃ    ﬀﬁﬂ $ %&'() 
3.86 1.31 
To which extent is the internal measure for operating income in accordance 
with the operating income published in the financial statements? 
    ﬀﬁﬂﬃ ﬃ 5 = very high / N=149) 
4.20 1.06 
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Indicator Mean Std. Dev. 
Sub-index: Reporting (continued) 
How many adjustments are necessary for reconciling the operating income 
based on financial GAAP to the financial KPI used for internal management 
control purposes? (reverse coded item) 
 ( 0 = >10 adjustments 
  1 = 8-10 adjustments 
  2 = 5-7 adjustments 
  3 = 3-4 adjustments 
  4 = 1-2 adjustments 
  5 = 0 adjustments / N=144) 
3.44 1.37 
To which extent differs the operating income based on financial GAAP in 
volume from the financial KPI used for internal management control purposes? 
(reverse coded item) 
     	
 
       
3.90 1.18 
Sub-index: Performance measurement  
To which extent is overall top management compensation based on financial 
GAAP based profit measures? 
     
 
    	  

 
3.66 1.30 
Sub-index: Accounting information technology design 
In our company, only one set of accounts (books) is used for both financial 
and management accounting purposes. 
   



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


ﬀ

ﬁ

 
  










ﬂ
  
ﬃ
 
4.16 1.27 
In our company exists one or more company-wide accounting databases 
containing actual and planning data that are used for both financial and 
management accounting purposes. 
 (0 = definitely 
ﬀ

ﬁ

 
  










ﬂ
  
ﬃ
 
3.83 1.55 
In our company, an integrated IT system (e.g., SAP-SEM) is available that 
provides a basis for both internal management reporting and consolidated 
financial statements. 
    







ﬀ

ﬁ

 
   definitely true / N=149) 
2.66 1.87 
Sub-index: Administration of the controlling function 
In our company, management accountants and financial accountants report to 
the same member of the executive board 
 (0 = definitely fﬀﬁ
 
    ﬂ  =149) 
4.72 0.94 
In our company, there is a mutual professional exchange between controllers 
and financial accountants. 
    







ﬀ

ﬁ

 
  










ﬂ
  
ﬃ
 
4.03 1.00 
In our company, the financial accountants are briefed by controllers on 
management reporting issues. 
    
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
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
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


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

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

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  
ﬃ
 
3.83 1.17 
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Appendix 2:  Summary statistics on   	
    	 consistency of 
  	 	 
Item Group Mean Std. Dev. 
Controllers and financial accountants have the same 
understanding of business performance. 
   ﬀﬁﬂﬃ ﬂ ! "! #  ﬀﬁﬂﬃ ﬁ$% & '()*+ 
Manager 3.78 1.11 
Controller 3.85 1.01 
Information provided by the controllers is consistent with 
accounting information based on financial GAAP. 
   ﬀﬁﬂﬃ ﬂ ! "! #  ﬀﬁﬂﬃ ﬁ$% & '()*+ 
Manager 3.46 1.26 
Controller 3.83 1.14 
Information provided by controllers and financial accountants 
adds up to a consistent view on the firm's business. 
   ﬀﬁﬂﬃ ﬂ ! "! 5 = definitely true / N=149) 
Manager 3.88 1.11 
Controller 4.11 0.98 
 
Appendix 3:  Summary statistics on   	
    	 
,

,
		 
-
,

-

.
	 
 
Item Group Mean Std. Dev. 
The management reports cover all important fields of business 
activity. 
   ﬀﬁﬂﬃ ﬂ ! "! #  ﬀﬁﬂﬃ ﬁ$% & '()*+ 
Manager 3.94 1.04 
Controller 4.16 0.80 
The management information system provided by controllers 
reflects actual circumstances in a comprehensive and valid 
fashion. 
 (0 = ﬀﬁﬂﬃ ﬂ ! "! #  ﬀﬁﬂﬃ ﬁ$% & '()*+ 
Manager 3.90 0.84 
Controller 4.14 0.67 
Information provided by controllers is very precise. 
   ﬀﬁﬂﬃ ﬂ ! "! #  ﬀﬁﬂﬃ ﬁ$% & '()*+ 
Manager 3.91 0.83 
Controller 3.99 0.76 
Information provided by controllers is up-to-date. 
   ﬀﬁﬂﬃ ﬂ ! "! #  ﬀﬁﬂﬃ ﬁ$% & '()*+ 
Manager 3.77 1.06 
Controller 3.96 0.79 
Information content and explanatory power of management 
reports are both high. 
   ﬀﬁﬂﬃ ﬂ ! "! #  definitely true / N=149) 
Manager 3.78 0.95 
Controller 3.96 0.71 
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Appendix 4:  Summary statistics on   	
    	 		 
impact on management decisions 
Item Group Mean Std. Dev. 
Controllers play a very important role in the decision-making 
process of our organization. 
   ﬀﬁﬀﬂﬃ  ﬃ!" #" $  ﬀﬁﬀﬂﬃ ﬂ%& ' ()*+, 
Manager 3.84 0.98 
Controller 3.79 0.84 
Management sets a high value on the controllers' opinion in the 
decision-making process. 
 (0 = definitely false, #" $  ﬀﬁﬀﬂﬃ ﬂ%& ' ()*+, 
Manager 3.81 0.91 
Controller 3.57 0.93 
Controllers have a strong influence on management decisions. 
   ﬀﬁﬀﬂﬃ  ﬃ!" #" $  ﬀﬁﬀﬂﬃ ﬂ%& ' ()*+, 
Manager 3.51 1.00 
Controller 3.32 0.92 
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